University of Chicago Law School

Chicago Unbound
Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers

Working Papers

2013

Federalism, Liberty, and Risk in NIFB v. Sebelius
Aziz Huq

Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/public_law_and_legal_theory
Part of the Law Commons

Chicago Unbound includes both works in progress and final versions of articles. Please be
aware that a more recent version of this article may be available on Chicago Unbound, SSRN or
elsewhere.
Recommended Citation
Aziz Huq, "Federalism, Liberty, and Risk in NIFB v. Sebelius" (University of Chicago Public Law & Legal
Theory Working Paper No. 425, 2013).

This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Working Papers at Chicago Unbound. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers by an authorized administrator of
Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

CHICAGO
PUBLIC LAW AND LEGAL THEORY WORKING PAPER NO. 425

FEDERALISM, LIBERTY, AND RISK IN NIFB V. SEBELIUS
Aziz Z. Huq

THE LAW SCHOOL
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
April 2013
This paper can be downloaded without charge at the Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper
Series: http://www.law.uchicago.edu/academics/publiclaw/index.html
and The Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection.

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2255192

Federalism, Liberty, and Risk in NFIB v. Sebelius
Aziz Z. Huq*
forthcoming in
The Future of Healthcare Reform in the U.S.
(A. Malani & M. Schill, eds., forthcoming University of Chicago press: 2014)

Abstract
This book chapter analyzes the Supreme Court’s decision in National
Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) v. Sebelius. Contra
conventional wisdom, it argues that the pivotal opinion of Chief Justice
Roberts is not well explained in federalism terms. Rather, the decision is
best understood in light of entrenched historical understandings of the
federal government’s appropriate role in managing diverse species of
risk.
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1.

Introduction

In the end, the market had it wrong. On June 28, 2012, Intrade
estimated a seventy-percent-plus probability that the individual mandate
component of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA)1
would be invalidated. Reporting the decision’s hand-down, CNN ran a
banner proclaiming invalidation for several minutes before switching
content. But if the decision in National Federation of Independent Business
(NFIB) v. Sebelius2 was a shock to mainstream media, it was no less
surprising to constitutional scholars. Once its fragmented opinions had been
assembled, the decision turned out not to flow simply from earlier
precedent. To the contrary, the decision overruled no Supreme Court
precedent and has ambiguous downstream consequences for legal doctrine.
Its place in constitutional history is accordingly a puzzle.
This essay offers an account of how NFIB v. Sebelius fits into that
constitutional tradition. Rather than arising from the lawyerly paraphernalia
of precedent, rules, and syllogistic reasoning, I argue that the NFIB Court’s
reasoning takes root in profound (if poorly specified) first-order normative
principles about the appropriate role of the federal government. To this end,
I make two claims—one negative, the other positive. The first concerns
federalism. The NFIB decision superficially turns on the relationship of the
federal government to the states, and so reflects judicial calibration of an
appropriate “federal balance.”3 Federalism, of course, has been a central
term of American political contention.4 By the late twentieth century,
‘federalism’ was invoked most often against federal regulation to favor state
autonomy.5 On superficial reading, NFIB v. Sebelius seems to advance that
decentralizing vision of federalism. But, I argue, federalism explains very
little of its outcome. Examination of its central holdings suggests that the
Court left the federal balance largely untouched.
Second, in lieu of federalism, I suggest that a dyad of opposing
values—liberty and risk—animate the Court’s ruling. The first half of this
1

Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). The PPACA was enacted alongside the Health
Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 123 Stat. 1029.
References to the PPACA or “Act” encompass both.
2
132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
3
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 578 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
4
Alison L. LaCroix, The Ideological Origins of American Federalism (2010).
5
It is hard to generalize here. Some Justices who have fervently pressed federalism values,
understood as states’ rights, in respect to state sovereign immunity and congressional
power also are exceedingly willing to find federal law preempts state regulation.
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pair is familiar: claims about liberty figured large in debates about the
PPACA.6 It was less frequently observed in those debates that many species
of risk management by the state limit some sort of ‘liberty’ as a cost of
spreading or mitigating risk. The ensuing trade-offs implicate questions
about when individuals should bear the costs of diffusing shared risks.
While framed as a case about constitutional law, the NFIB opinion is, in my
view, better glossed as a function of the Justices’ normative judgments
about the permissible domain of risk-liberty equilibria the federal
government can strike.
2.

The PPACA

In an obvious sense, the PPACA concerns risk and how we manage
it. Unique among wealthy democracies, the pre-PPACA United States
possessed no “guaranteed health coverage for all (or virtually all) citizens or
measures to contain costs at a high level of aggregation.”7 Consequently,
nearly 87 million people were without insurance at some point between
2007 and 2009, and 45,000 working-age Americas dying annually due to
underinsurance.8 This is hardly a surprise. In a market-dominated system,
competition predictably drives insurers toward actuarially fair pricing by
which individuals must pay in line with the risks they represent regardless
of ability to do so.9 Growing economic inequality since the 1970s has
inevitably cashed out as more uneven distributions of healthcare coverage.10
Despite these high social-welfare costs, serial attempts at healthcare
reform since the Truman presidency have foundered in a “policy trap”:
“[A]n increasingly costly and complicated system … satisfied enough of the
public and so enriche[d] the health care industry as to make change
extraordinarily difficult.”11 A combination of tax subsidies for employerprovided insurance, ‘universal’ benefits such as Medicare, and some
6

See Christopher Schmidt, The Tea Party and the Constitution, 39 Hastings Const. L.
Q.193, 237 (2011).
7
Jacob Hacker, Health Care Reform 2.0: Fulfilling the Promise of the Affordable Care Act,
in Shared Responsibility, Shared Risk: Government, Markets and Social Policy in the
Twenty-First Century, 185, 186–87 (Jacob Hacker & Ann O’Leary eds., 2012).
8
Id. at 189-90.
9
See generally Jacob S. Hacker, The Great Risk Shift 140-43 (2006) [hereinafter Hacker,
Great Risk Shift] (arguing that adverse selection leads to pervasive health care market
failure in the United States).
10
Paul Starr, Remedy and Reaction: The Peculiar American Struggle Over Health Care
Reform 5 (2011).
11
Id. at 2.

3

measure of ‘welfare’ measures such as Medicaid left uninsured “a mostly
low-income population with no coherence, organization, or political
power.”12 Given this, it was somewhat remarkable reform occurred at all.
Even if political constraints did not foreclose reform, they
nonetheless shaped it. The PPACA is thus modest along two salient
dimensions. First, the Act focused on underinsurance, not cost-containment.
Second, it made no attempt to recast the existing patchwork of private and
public healthcare coverage. It instead accepted and broadened existing fonts
of coverage. As a result, many dysfunctional elements remain, such as the
regressive tax expenditures on employer contributions for medical
insurance that cost the federal government about $177 billion in 2011.13
At its core, the PPACA expands three longstanding elements of
American healthcare provision.14 First, roughly sixty percent of workingage Americans are now covered by employer-sponsored health insurance.15
The Act largely exempts this large-group market from new regulations. It
does require employers with more than 100 personnel to provide “minimum
essential coverage” by 2014.16 The large-group market, though, is already
regulated to redistribute risk. The Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act prohibits group health plans from discriminating on the
basis of health factors respecting eligibility, benefits, or premiums.17
Interestingly, this nondiscrimination rule injects risk spreading into market
provision of health insurance, but is not (to date) politically controversial.
Second, approximately a fifth of the public are covered by federal
statutory programs such as Medicare or Medicaid.18 The 2010 Act “made
12

Id. at 7.
Suzanne Mettler, Reconstituting the Submerged State: The Challenges of Social Policy
Reform in the Obama Era, 8 Persp. Pol. 803, 806 (2010).
14
The following relies on Tom Baker, Health Insurance, Risk, and Responsibility after the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 159 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1577, 1580-1607 (2012).
15
Elise Gould, The Erosion of Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance: Declines Continue
for the Seventh Year Running, 39 Int'l J. Health Servs. 669, 669 (2009) (“Employersponsored health insurance (ESI) remains the most prominent form of health coverage in
the United States, at 62.9 percent of the under-65 population; however, the rate of this
coverage has fallen every year since 2000, when 68.3 percent had ESI.”).
16
See Baker, supra note 14, at 1592–93 (summarizing PPACA regulation of the largegroup market).
17
29 U.S.C. §1182 (2006). Health care plans are also covered by the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974
18
Kaiser Family Foundation, Fast facts, Health Insurance Coverage in the U.S., 2011,
available at http://facts.kff.org/chart.aspx?ch=2874
13
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no fundamental changes to Medicare,”19 but its changes to Medicaid
catalyzed public and judicial attention. Medicaid is a cooperative federalism
program. It is jointly funded by the states and the federal government,
although precise coverage definitions vary by state.20 States submit a “State
Plan” to the Secretary of Health and Human Services for authorization.21
Until the PPACA, the plan had to cover a series of defined groups,
including the elderly, disabled, blind, pregnant, and children.22 The PPACA
is the fifth statutory expansion of Medicaid,23 and adds a new mandatory
category to state plans as of 2014. This new category comprises all citizens
and legal residents with incomes up to 133 percent of the federal poverty
line.24 It will add to Medicaid largely “non-elderly, non-disabled, lowincome single adults or couples without children.”25 The federal
government provides full funding for the first three years of this expansion,
gradually reducing its contribution to a floor of 90 percent in 2020.26 Under
longstanding language in Medicaid’s organic statute, the Secretary of
Health and Human Services may cut some or all of a state’s Medicaid
funding if it fails to comply with certain obligations.27
The final, and least functional, element of the healthcare landscape
is the small-group and individual market. It is here that the PPACA does
most of its work. As many readers will know, it introduces a suite of
measures designed to expand and render accessible the private market for
healthcare insurance. To this end, it imposes inter alia minimum essential
coverage and community-rating rules on insurers; a mandate on states to
create insurance exchanges to facilitate consumers’ purchases; and an
“individual mandate” on lawful U.S. residents and citizens. With
exceptions, the individual mandate provision requires any lawfully present
person who lacks a defined quantum of minimum coverage as of 2014 to
pay an escalating series of “penalt[ies]” (or “shared responsibility
19

Baker, supra note 14, at 1581-83 (noting slightly increased progressivity of Medicare
financing under PPACA).
20
See Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 37 (1981) (discussing scope of state
discretion).
21
42 U.S.C. § 1396.
22
42 U.S.C. §1396a(a)(10)(A)(I)-(VII).
23
Nicole Huberfield, Elizabeth Weeks Leonard & Kevin Outterson, Plunging into Endless
Difficulties: Medicaid and Coercion in the Healthcare Cases 15 (2012), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2128760
24
42 U.S.C. §1396a(a)(10)(A)(VIII).
25
Huberfield et al. supra note 23, at 18.
26
42 U.S.C. §1397d(y)(1).
27
42 U.S.C. §1396c.
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payments.”)28 Through these measures, the PPACA aims to nudge insurers
to expand some coverage to the most needy, while preventing healthy
individuals from exiting the insurance pool. The net intended result is a
broad, diverse, and actuarially secure risk-pool.
3.

The Legal Challenges

Within minutes of the PPACA’s enactment, states, individuals, and
employers filed suit challenging the Act.29 The challenges, their counsel,
and supporters drew from President Obama’s Republican and Tea Party
opposition.30 But the litigation marked a startling public volte face for a
Republican Party that in 2008 proclaimed (in a party platform no less) that
“[j]udicial activism is a grave threat to the rule of law because
unaccountable federal judges are usurping democracy.”31 In effect, elements
of the Republican Party treated the federal courts as another stage in the
federal legislative process on healthcare reform—one step beyond
bicameralism and presentment. Whatever other long-term effects the case
has, its first consequence was thus bipartisan ratification of the federal
bench as the Toquevillian cockpit for resolution of divisive national policy
questions.32
The federal courts, however, are not mere extensions of Congress.
Interest groups well-positioned to influence elected officials are not
necessarily capable of persuading judges. Law and politics are distinct
mechanisms for the exercise of power in the United States. Different
resources—fiscal and ideological—matter. In Congress, so-called big
business, as represented by, say, the Chamber of Commerce, often prevails.
In the courts, employers did not fare so well—their challenge to the
PPACA’s employer mandate fizzled.33 After divergent results in various
28

26 U.S.C. §5000A(b).
Complaint, Florida v. U.S. Dep't. of Health & Human Servs., No. 3:10-cv-91-RV-EMT
(N.D. Fla. Mar. 23, 2010).
30
For enumeration of plaintiffs and counsel, see Ilya Shapiro, A Long Strange Trip: My
First Year Challenging the Constitutionality of Obamacare, 6 FIU L. Rev. 29, 33–34
(2010).
31
Republican National Committee, 2008 Republican Platform, Government Reform,
http://www.gop.com/2008Platform/GovernmentReform.htm
32
Chief Justice Roberts’s averment of “respect for Congress’s policy judgments” at the
opening of his opinion, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 25790–80 (2012), assumes a different cast in this
light.
33
See, e.g., Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services 716
F.Supp.2d 1120 (N.D. Fla. 2010) (dismissing challenges to employer mandate).
29
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federal courts of appeals,34 it was the challenges to the individual mandate
and the Medicaid expansion that made it to the Supreme Court.35 It was
states and self-declared mavens of liberty who seemed to have caught the
Court’s ear.
The bottom line of the ensuing decision is this: The Court upheld
both the individual mandate and the Medicaid expansion but invalidated the
federal government’s power to punish states’ failure to expand Medicaid by
withholding all Medicaid funds.36 All parts of PPACA went into effect, but
the federal government lost a stick to punish recalcitrant states. That simple
result, however, obscures complex details. Across 193 pages of the U.S.
Reports, nine Justices filed four interlocking, overlapping, and antinomial
opinions—an opinion “for the Court” by Chief Justice Roberts (joined in
places by Justices Breyer and Kagan); a partial concurrence by Justices
Ginsburg and Sotomayor (also joined in places by Breyer and Kagan); a
joint dissent from Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito; and a short
solo dissent from Justice Thomas. Discerning the legally binding ‘holding’
of the case requires some parsing to discern the narrowest ground of
decision to which a majority of Justices ascribed.37 But ignoring some
important technicalities, it can plausibly be said that the opinion rests on
three central questions: (1) Is imposition of the individual mandate within
Congress’s Article I power to regulate commerce, or, (2) alternatively
within its power to tax for the General Welfare? And (3) does the Medicaid
expansion violate the constitutional principle of federalism enshrined in the
Tenth Amendment to the Constitution? Briefly, the answers are probably
not, certainly yes, and somewhat.
To begin with, the Chief Justice and the joint dissent reasoned that
the Commerce Clause—long the most important repository of federal
regulatory authority—could not underwrite the individual mandate.38
According to the Chief Justice, the federal government has no Commerce
Clause power to mandate insurance purchases by otherwise healthy
individuals, even if they are likely later to need coverage. Previous cases,
however, had permitted regulatory extrusions beyond the Commerce
34

NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2580–81 (describing outcomes in D.C. Circuit, Fourth, Sixth, and
Eleventh Circuit courts of appeals).
35
132 S. Ct. 603 (2011).
36
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2608.
37
See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).
38
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2585-93 (Roberts, C.J.); id. at 2644-55. For a discussion of the
Commerce Clause, see Aziz Z. Huq, Tiers of Scrutiny in Enumerated Powers
Jurisprudence, 79 U. Chi. L. Rev. – (forthcoming 2013).
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Clause’s scope in light of Congress’s supplemental power to enact
“Necessary and Proper” additions to comprehensive federal regulatory
schemes.39 The mandate was fairly plainly a necessary element to the
general scheme of healthcare regulation. Roberts, however, rejected this
possibility by stating that Congress’s Necessary and Proper did not
encompass “any great substantive and independent power[s]” such as
mandating the execution of a contract where none previously existed.40
A different coalition of five Justices, again with the Chief Justice
penning the crucial opinion, then sustained the individual mandate as a
valid exercise of congressional taxing authority.41 Roberts semaphored that
such authority had limits: A tax tipped over into an impermissible “mere
penalty” when it eviscerated the individual’s “lawful choice to do or not do
a certain act.”42 Quite when this happens, Roberts declined to specify.
The final element of the decision concerned the Medicaid
expansion. Again, Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion is useful taken as the
dispositive guide. Until 2012, the Court had placed only modest restraints
on the federal government’s power to impose conditions on grants to the
states.43 These largely pertained to the clarity of conditions.44 This rule
treated states as capable bargaining partners, but policed federal shading on
statutory deals via a clear notice requirement. The notice rule found
additional justification as a means of fostering democratic accountability: It
lowered the cost to voters of ascertaining when a given rule was mandated
by state or federal law. Under these precedents, the Medicaid expansion
seemingly presented no constitutional worry. States have been on notice
since the program’s inception of Congress’s unfettered “right to alter,
amend, or repeal any provision” of the Medicaid statute.45 Nor was there
much doubt which level of government should be held accountable for
“Obamacare.”
But Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion ignored the notice rule. He first
said that the statutory reservation of authority to change Medicaid could not
possibly mean what it said. Instead, Roberts asserted, the Medicaid
39

The leading case is Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2591-92.
41
Id. at 2593-2601.
42
Id. at 2599-2600.
43
South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
44
Sossamon v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 1651, 1658 (2011).
45
42 U.S.C. §1304.
40
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expansion was “a shift in kind, not merely degree,” between “old” Medicaid
and “new Medicaid.”46 The new program, he explained, “is no longer a
program to care for the neediest among us, but rather an element of a
comprehensive national plan to provide universal health insurance
coverage.”47 Citing the magnitude of Medicaid spending as a proportion of
state’s budgets (about a fifth), Roberts proclaimed that the power to
withdraw all Medicaid funding for failure to participate in the 2011
expansion was a “gun to the head” and “economic dragooning that leaves
the States with no real option but to acquiesce.”48 Again without specifying
any analytically crisp rule, he held that the power to withdraw all Medicaid
funding was unconstitutionally coercive and therefore could not be
exercised.49
4.

Estimating the Footprint of NFIB v. Sebelius

Not since the New Deal has the Court seriously grappled with the
constitutionality of a major federal social program.50 So anticipation of the
decision ran high. But the decision’s immediate footprint, measured as a
matter of constitutional doctrine or public policy, was faint. The Court
overruled no earlier precedent, even though it had previously issued rulings
upholding sweeping New Deal and post-New Deal regulatory programs. To
the chagrin of commentators who hoped the Court would retrench federal
power back to pre-New Deal contours, only Justice Thomas even hinted at a
desire to go that far, and then in a conspicuously lonesome dissent.51
As to the cash value of NFIB’s new rules, the decision casts no
existing federal program into constitutional peril. The leading legislative
proposal that would face potential constitutional objections under the
decision is the proposal to substitute social security with mandatory
individualized retirement accounts—ironically, an idea typically offered by
right-of-center politicians and think-tanks.52 Even with social-security
privatization, it is not hard to imagine that any now-unconstitutional
mechanism could be replicated with well-designed tax incentives.
46

NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2605-06.
Id.
48
Id. at 2604-05.
49
Id. at 2641-42.
50
The Court, however, on several occasions grappled with the constitutionality of major
civil rights laws. See, e.g. Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
51
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2677 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
52
Hacker, The Great Risk Shift, supra note 9, at 37.
47
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Perhaps more consequential is the absence of any litmus test for
ascertaining what constitutes an impermissibly coercive exercise of federal
spending. This means there is no way to predict when any change to
conditional spending efforts, including other elements of the PPACA’s
amendments to the Medicaid statute, may risk invalidation. Judicial refusal
to elaborate a clear rule leaves legislative drafters at sea. Because legislators
must labor under the burden of large ambiguity as to whether their
compromises will hold, some otherwise-viable deals will not be made.
Some states will not benefit from sought-for federal spending because they
fear a ‘heckler’s veto’ by other litigious states. When legislation does
emerge, it is likely be delayed and impeded by judicial challenges, frittering
away federal dollars on lawyering in lieu of social goods. Ironically, the
Chief Justice has elsewhere railed against rules that create open-ended
uncertainty.53
In sum, the NFIB presents something of a mystery. It does not break
from, or even really extend, past precedent. It impacts immediately no
federal program other than the PPACA—and then only at the margin. At
best, its most immediate consequences flow from the absence of decision,
not the content of its announced rules. How can we account for such an
opinion? In what follows, I offer an account of its immanent logic, i.e., the
first-order normative principles that best fit the Court’s judgment. To begin
with, though, we must examine and eliminate the most obvious explanation
for the decision—federalism.
5.

Federalism as Faux Ami

The Court typically frames questions about the scope of federal
power as a matter of federalism—i.e., the balance of authority between the
several states and the national government. Vigilant policing of the outer
boundaries to Congress’s power is underwritten by the Court’s perception
that wayward federal lawmakers have only fragile incentives to honor
states’ interests on Capitol Hill.54 At first blush, the Medicaid holding—
framed initially by litigators in terms of states’ rights and the Tenth
Amendment—seems squarely a function of judicial recalibration of the
federal-state balance.

53

Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868, 893–99 (2009) (Roberts, J.,
dissenting),
54
Id. at 578 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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Yet this moves too quickly. In my view, none of the main elements
of NFIB v. Sebelius are well-explained by federalism concerns. To see this,
we need to take each holding in sequence. As a threshold matter, neither the
Commerce Clause nor the Taxing Power rulings have any clear effect on
the scope of state regulatory authority. At best, the Court preserved a
domain of state authority over mandatory purchases and capped one species
of taxation. It is hard to see much practical significance in either holding.
On the one hand, it is difficult to conjure up state mandatory-purpose laws
that have free reign now given the Commerce Clause holding. But what
good is fencing off a domain of independent state authority if it scarcely
sees usage? In any case, it will often be feasible to reframe impermissible
federal interference with inactivity as valid regulation of an activity.
Consider, for example, the PPACA individual mandate. Had it been
invalidated, Congress could—politics permitting—have rewritten the law to
mandate receipt of healthcare on the possession of continuing adequate
insurance coverage. Close, if not perfect, substitutes are thus often available
when the constitutional bar on federally mandated purchases kicks in. On
the other hand, the Court’s constraint on the Taxing Power matters only so
far as it protects states’ purses by reducing the ‘crowding out’ effect of
federal taxes.55 But even if the Court limited federal taxes on activities, it
did not address income or capital taxes. Any effect on federal crowd-out of
state taxes from NFIB will consequently be de minimus in character.
Additionally, there is less federalism ‘bite’ in NFIB’s conditional
spending holding than first appears. Indeed, the Court’s holding may even
diminish states’ latitude to strike beneficial bargains with the federal
government. After NFIB, the federal government must be leery of entering
into long-term cooperative federalism programs pursuant to which states
develop implementation apparatuses. It must rationally anticipate being
locked into such relationship on judicially specified terms. At least in some
cases, Pareto-optimal deals may not be struck because of this uncertainty.
Some states will lose out because beneficial cooperative federal programs
will not be created or expanded.
The Court’s claim that states were ‘coerced’ also hides analytic
confusion. In other constitutional cases, the Court tends to disparage
individual claims of coercion.56 As a result, it has developed no definition
55

See Brian Galle, A Republic of the Mind: Cognitive Biases, Fiscal Federalism, and
Section 164 of the Tax Code, 82 Ind. L.J. 673, 702–09 (2007)
56
See Janice Nadler, No Need to Shout: Bus Sweeps and the Psychology of Coercion,
2002 Sup. Ct. Rev. 153.
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of individual coercion. In NFIB, this inchoate, haphazard concept of
individual coercion is applied to an anthropomorphized, subnational
sovereign.57 The result inevitably has an ad hoc flavor. So although the
Court intimated that states’ settled expectations had been disrupted,58 it is
unclear why. Unlike individuals, states lack psychological dispositions such
as anticipation. They also lack any constitutional entitlement to Medicaid
funding. To the contrary, they can plainly operate without such federal
subvention. As recently as 1982, Arizona opted wholly out of Medicaid.59 A
funding cutoff now would leave a state with two options: raise taxes or
allow the poor to go without healthcare. Why should states be spared this
fundamental public choice? Why in particular should deregulation-minded
Republican governors who resisted the PPACA benefit from an entitlement
to federal subsidies for welfare programs? Isn’t this to allow them to have
their deregulatory cake while also ‘consuming’ federally funding for
regulation?
Even if states could be coerced, another problem comes into view.
Judicial protection of states against coercion rests on the assumption that
states are not full sovereign entities capable of contracting freely with the
federal government. Superseding a notice regime with a coercion regime,
the Court treated states as callow naïfs unable to navigate the political
world. Rather than treating them with “dignity,”60 the NFIB Court took
states as wards. In expressive and substantive terms, then, the conditionalspending holding in NFIB v. Sebelius cannot be glossed in terms of
federalism terms any more than the Commerce Clause and Taxing Power
holdings can. Another analytic frame is needed to explain the decision.
6.

The Liberty-Risk Dyad

A central role of government is managing risk through prevention,
risk-shifting, and -spreading.61 Since the Founding, governments in the
United States have installed risk management policies, from limited
liability, early banking regulation, and bankruptcy laws, to intellectual and
57

For a review of debates on coercion, see Aziz Z. Huq, Peonage and Contractual Liberty,
101 Colum. L. Rev. 351, 367-70 (2001).
58
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2604-05.
59
Huberfield et al., supra note 23, at 11, n.71.
60
Judith Resnik & Julie Chi-hye Suk, Adding Insult to Injury: Questioning the Role of
Dignity in Conceptions of Sovereignty, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 1921 (2003).
61
Tom Baker & David Moss, Government as Risk Manager, in New Perspectives on
Regulation 87 (David Moss & John Cisternino eds., 2009).
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real property rights.62 In recent decades, the federal government has
experimented with new institutional forms to produce security against
pandemic illnesses, terrorist attack, natural catastrophes, and economic
shocks.63
Yet risk regulation has always been controversial.64 It often entails
taxes, liabilities, or penalties on others better able to mitigate or absorb risk.
The marginal social welfare cost of suffering different risks varies
immensely by wealth and social circumstances. As a result of these
dynamics, the choice of which risk to address (and how to do so)
necessarily has redistributive consequences. Concomitantly, risk regulation
is a focal point for interest-group activity and intensive ideological
investments aimed at either legitimating or discrediting the federal
regulatory state. Anti-statist, laissez-faire intuitions, coupled to nostalgic
invocation of a prelapsarian smaller state, persist in American political
culture.
NFIB is profitably understood as an attempt to constitutionalism the
fraught question of how to calibrate the federal role in managing risk in
relation to lost liberties. Although the Constitution contains no express
theory of risk regulation, each of the three elements of the NFIB decision
can be interpreted as an attempt to place boundaries around the state’s
operation as risk manager—to calibrate, that is, the permissible range of
equilibria between social risk and individual liberty. Rather than grounding
this analysis in a simple or familiar social welfare function, however, the
Court’s analysis employs categories drawn from American history to
articulate a normative vision of what the federal government can and cannot
do.
Consider first NFIB’s Commerce Clause and the Taxing Power
holdings. Both turn on a judgment about the appropriate quantum of social
risk that can be assigned to an individual. The axial moment in Roberts’s
Commerce Clause reasoning holding is his assertion that a federal power to
mandate purchases falls outside both the Commerce Clause and the
Necessary and Proper powers because it is a “great substantive and
independent power.” Set aside for a moment the peculiar genealogy of that
62

David A. Moss, When All Else Fails: Government as the Ultimate Risk Manager 2-9,
295-325 (2002).
63
See Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Governing Security: The Hidden Origins of American
Security Agencies (2012).
64
Moss, supra note 62, at 296-302.
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last phrase, which has not figured in the U.S. reports for almost 200 years.65
Focus rather on the question why a power to mandate purchases should fall
into the category. Only two years before NFIB, the Court had read the
Necessary and Proper Clause to extend other enumerated powers to reach a
confinement power even in the absence of any criminal conviction.66 Since
this earlier ruling was not overruled, NFIB’s conclusion implies that it is
“great substantive and independent power” to require a person to enter a
contract, but not to lock that same person up without criminal trial. To say
the least, the intuition here is not obvious. Nothing in the Constitution’s text
predicts it. Nor is it obviously justified in welfarist terms.
The basic idea that decisions about private contracting relationships
are beyond the reach of the state, however, is not unfamiliar to students of
American legal thought. In the postbellum “classical” period of American
legal thought, scholars and judges refined a notion of the “liberty of
contract.” State and federal courts then pressed this into service to resist for
Progressive-Era and the New-Deal regulation of a redistributive bent.67
Under the liberty-of-contract rubric, judges struck down minimum wage
and maximum hour laws, labor laws, and union-protective measures.
According to one of its theorists, William Graham Sumner, liberty of
contract reflected and promoted a “society of free and independent men,
who form ties without favor or obligation, and co-operate without cringing
or intrigue … [that] gives the utmost room and chance for individual
development, and for all the self-reliance and dignity of a free man.”68 That
is, it carved out a space of atomized, individual liberty against the
emasculating risk-spreading depredations of the state.
The analogy between the NFIB opinion and old-style liberty of
contract is, to be sure, inexact. The Court in 2012 did not invalidate a
legislative prohibition on contracting, as in earlier cases. It stuck down a
legislative mandate to contract. But both liberty to contract and liberty from
contract are plausibly understood as rooted in the same ideal—Sumner’s
“society of free and independent men.” Sumner implicitly contrasted a
masculine norm of rugged, autonomous personhood against a vision of
government risk-managers as the fons et origo of emasculating “ties [of]
65
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favor [and] obligation.” Although there is little chance that the Court will
return soon to a full-blooded embrace of liberty of contract, the NFIB
decision demonstrates that latter idea may still inform at the margin judicial
approaches in cases where government risk-regulation can be framed as
constitutionally doubtful.
The Court’s Taxing Power logic has a similar cast. The Court does
not question the federal government’s power to impose taxes, but intimates
that it cannot use this power to mandate the internalization of all spillover
effects of risky individual behavior.69 The Court flags an outer boundary at
which personal autonomy trumps collective social welfare. Each must then
stand or fall on their own. To many, the Court’s insistence that the
Constitution protects the wealthy and healthy from being required to
contribute to mitigating the health perils of indigence will seem ungrounded
in constitutional text and morally obtuse. But perhaps that’s the point. It is
harsh medicine indeed to be “free and independent.”
Just like the Commerce Clause and Taxing Power decisions, the
Court’s treatment of the Medicaid expansion rests on an implicit normative
account of constitutionally permission risk-liberty trade-offs. Again, this
normative theory is not derived from the Constitution’s text. Again, it seems
guided by unstated assumptions about the moral desert of different
recipients of government largesse. Again, the Court’s normative boundaries
have a somewhat gendered cast.
There are two risk-related dynamics at work in NFIB’s conditional
spending holding. First, recall that the NFIB Court took states to be
incapable of freely contracting with the federal government, instead treating
them as quasi-wards of the Court. This holding shelters not only states’
purses by allowing them to resist changes to Medicaid while maintaining
historical levels of federal support, but also sheltered state politicians, who
could avoid potentially hard choices between raising taxes and slashing
benefits. In effect, the Court gave states and their elected leaders a species
of constitutionally embedded insurance against future federal-policy-change
risk: Even if a statute warns plainly warns that a cooperative program may
change over time, the Constitution thus requires the lion’s share of changerelated risk to fall on the federal government, not the states. Like any
beneficiary of a compulsory insurance policy, state officials likely will fall
69
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prey to moral hazard—here, by shading on the new Medicaid program or
scanting other federal requirements. This compulsory insurance term thus
redistributes risk from state governments to individuals. It exposes the most
impoverished and vulnerable slices of the population to greater expected
health risk, while amplifying the political and fiscal capital of state elites.
The conditional spending holding implies a second normative
judgment about when and how government can legitimately step in as risk
manager. A central move in Roberts’s analysis is the assertion that the
PPACA effectuated “a shift in kind, not merely degree,” between “old”
Medicaid and “new Medicaid.”70 The Chief Justice glossed this assertion by
noting that Medicaid, as expanded, was “no longer a program to care for the
neediest among us.”71 Of course, given the relatively low floor on
eligibility, it is not obvious this is literally true. Further, federal law already
mandated coverage up to 133 percent of the poverty line for some groups.
Why then was extending this higher cut-off to other groups the crossing of a
constitutional Rubicon?72 The reasons given in the opinion are
unpersuasive. Roberts glossed his ‘different of kind, not quantity’ argument
by pointing out that the Medicaid expansion had been enacted as part of
comprehensive healthcare reform. But this is a non-sequitor. There is no
reason to conclude that enactment context radically changed the effects of
Medicaid reform. Moreover, it is not at all clear how the 2012 change is
qualitatively distinct from five earlier changes beginning in 1967, which
have included coverage expansions to reach young adults; redefinitions of
mandatory benefit packages; and (most recently) major changes to the scope
of prescription drug coverage.73 All these had significant fiscal and health
consequences. Why then was the 2010 amendment distinct?
To understand the Court’s reasoning, we can instead focus on Chief
Justice Roberts’s italicized observation that the PPACA required states “to
cover all individuals under the age of 65 with incomes below 133 percent of
the federal poverty line.”74 The key word is the one that Roberts italicized:
“all.” The objection here is not that those at 133 percent of the poverty line
are not in desperate straits –although that would be a controversial and
70

NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2605-06.
Id.
72
Huberfield et al. supra note 23, at 14. The federal poverty is not an objective measure of
need. Diana Karter Appelbaum. The Level of the Poverty Line: A Historical Survey, 51
Soc. Sci. Rev. 514 (1977).
73
Huberfield et al. supra note 23, at 15–16.
74
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2601 (emphasis in original).
71

16

hardly self-evident claim. Rather, Roberts’ point is that Medicaid had gone
from covering largely women and children to one that covered the poor
generally. That is, it was only when Medicaid ceased to concern women
and children only—and when it extended to poor men too that the program
changed in “kind, not merely degree.” The expected gender identity of
Medicaid recipients hence seems at work in the Court’s analysis.
We might gloss this line of argument as follows. States, the Court
reasons, have a constitutionally protected expectation of what Medicaid
covers. This expectation rests upon a “recognizably gendered vie[w] of
what a welfare state should offer”—one that has been extensively analyzed
by social historians.75 As summarized recently by one historian, the United
States developed in the twentieth-century a “discriminatory ‘two-track’
welfare state” that endows “white, male industrial workers and their
dependents” with stable entitlement programs, while women and minorities
are streamed into fiscally fragile and socially stigmatizing welfare
programs.”76 Notwithstanding the recent vintage of this model, the NFIB
Court treated this dichotomized model of welfare as constitutionally
protected. It assumed, in other words, that states were entitled by the
Constitution to rely on the existence of cooperative welfare programs that
encompassed only those traditionally treated as deserving within the
moralized, stereotyping lineaments of a gendered welfare state. It is worth
noting that different coalitions of the Court have elsewhere warned that
rules resting on the “social and economic inferiority of women” receive
heightened equal protection scrutiny.77
The Court’s reasoning, in short, not only allocates risk between
states and the federal government, but also entrenches hierarchical and
subordinating modalities of managing social risk first developed in the early
twentieth century. In this fashion, the decision can be understood as
enforcing plural normative limits on the federal government’s role as risk
manager beyond the liberty of contract.
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7.

Conclusion

Not federalism, but a constitutionalized view of normatively
permissible risk-liberty trade-off best explains NFIB. That normative vision
is not grounded in constitutional text or tradition. It instead reflects laissezfaire instincts and gendered understandings of welfare familiar from the
early twentieth-century. Designers of future social insurance programs
would do well to bear in mind this lingering historical hangover in the
federal bench. Others may well reflect on whether it reflects a desirable
approach to managing risk in our diverse, hazard-filled Republic.
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